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. REHABILITATING FEDERALISM
Erwin Chemerinsky*
To MAKE A NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM. By Samuel H. Beer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
1993. Pp. xxi, 474. $29.95.

Historically, federalism has appeared in political debate primarily
as an argument to support conservative causes. During the early nineteenth century, for example, John Calhoun argued that states had independent sovereignty and could interpose their authority between the
federal government and the people to nullify federal actions restricting
slavery (p. 224). Similarly, during Reconstruction, southern states
claimed that the federal military presence was incompatible with state
sovereignty and federalism. 1
In the early twentieth century, opponents of federal legislation successfully used federalism as the basis for challenging laws regulating
child labor, imposing the minimum wage, and protecting consumers. 2
During the Depression, conservatives objected to many of President
Franklin Roosevelt's proposals, such as social security, on the ground
that they usurped functions properly left to state governments. 3
During the 1950s and 1960s, those objecting to federal civil rights
efforts phrased their protests primarily in terms of federalism.
Southerners challenged Supreme Court decisions mandating desegregation and objected to proposed federal civil rights legislation by resurrecting the arguments of John Calhoun. Proponents defended
segregation and discrimination less on the grounds that they were desirable practices and more in terms of the states' rights to choose their
own laws concerning race relations. 4
• Legion Lex Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.S. 1975, Northwestern; J.D. 1978, Harvard. - Ed.
1. For example, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872), the Supreme
Court narrowly construed the Reconstruction-era amendments, based in part on federalism considerations. Notably, the Court gave the Privileges or Immunities Clause an extremely narrow
construction because of its belief that the provision was not intended to alter federal-state relations. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 74-80.
2. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (invalidating the federal regulation of employment, including a minimum wage); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)
(invalidating the federal regulation of child labor), overruled by United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895) (holding that the Sherman
Antitrust Act could not be applied to businesses engaged in production).
3. See, e.g.• WILLIAM MANCHESTER, THE GLORY AND THE DREAM 137 (1974) ("To the
conservative justices, apparently, any federal participation in local problems was forbidden.").
4. Cf. pp. 20-21 (discussing the "compact model," in which states and nation are separate
political communities).
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In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan proclaimed a "new federalism" as the basis for attempting to dismantle federal social welfare
programs (p. 2). In his first presidential inaugural address, President
Reagan said that he sought to "restor[e] the balance between ... levels
of government." 5 His administration thus employed federalism as its
rationale for cutting back on countless federal programs.
Hindsight reveals that federalism has primarily been an argument
conservatives have used to resist progressive federal efforts, especially
in the areas of civil rights and social welfare. There is, of course, nothing inherent in federalism that makes it conservative. In recent years,
for example, prominent liberals, such as Justice William Brennan,
have argued that there should be more use of state constitutions to
protect individual liberties. 6
What is striking, however, about the historical use of federalism
arguments is that the discussions are very much value-laden. Advocates debate important issues of national policy in terms of the proper
allocation of power between the federal and state governments.
Yet, each year as I teach constitutional law and specifically the
material about federalism, I am struck by the absence of discussion
about underlying values in the material. Supreme Court decisions
about federalism rarely do more than offer slogans about the importance of autonomous state governments. Occasionally, the Court will
mention that states are important as laboratories of ideas or that state
governments are crucial as a check on the tyranny of the national
political govemment. 7 Never, though, is there much elaboration of
the values of federalism, and rarely is there any explanation of how the
values of federalism relate to the Court's holdings. For example, in its
1992 decision in New York v. United States, 8 the Supreme Court relied
on federalism and the Tenth Amendment to invalidate a provision of
federal law. 9 Yet the Court provided little discussion about why a
federal statute requiring states to dispose safely of nuclear wastes undermined important values of federalism.
Indeed, I believe that, of all of the areas of constitutional law, it is
in discussions about federalism that the underlying values are least
discussed and most disconnected from the legal doctrines. In separation-of-powers cases, courts frequently give explicit consideration to
the tension between accountability and fiexibility. 10 In dormant com5. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address, PUB. PAPERS 1, 3 (Jan. 20, 1981).
6. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
7. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 111 S. Ct. 2395, 2399-400 (1991) (discussing the value of
federalism in checking national power).
8. 112 s. Ct. 2408 (1992).
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2428-29.
10. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing in
favor of the legislative veto based on the importance of checks and balances); United States v.
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merce clause cases, courts often weigh the importance of a national
market economy unrestricted by protectionist state laws. 11 In equal
protection cases, courts eloquently speak of the need for racial and
gender equality. 12 In procedural due process cases, courts identify and
expressly balance the underlying values of accurate decisionmaking,
individual interests, and government efficiency. 13 In freedom of
speech cases, courts constantly discuss the value of expression and the
dangers of government censorship. 14 But where in federalism cases is
there any careful exploration of why state autonomy matters and how
specific federal actions undermine it?
In fact, post·1937 Supreme Court decisions concerning federalism
have been paradoxical. The Supreme Court has aggressively used fed·
eralism as the basis for limiting federaljudicial power, but has almost
completely refused to employ federalism to limit federal legislative
power. This approach to federalism persisted almost unchanged for
fifty.five years, from 1937 until 1992, with the Court declaring only
one federal statute unconstitutional on federalism grounds, and that
case - National League of Cities v. Usery - the Court later expressly
overruled. 15 During this same period, however, the Court has fre·
quently used federalism as the basis for limiting federal judicial power
- for example, by requiring abstention, 16 expanding the scope of the
Eleventh Amendment and state immunity to federal court litigation, 17
and limiting the scope of federal habeas corpus review. 18
I sketch this history because it is only against this backdrop that
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319-21 (1936) (discussing the importance of according the President broad powers in the area of foreign policy).
11. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (discussing the harms
of protectionist state legislation); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (same).
12. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (gender equality); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racial equality).
13. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (articulating the balancing
test for procedural due process). For an application of the Mathews balancing test, see Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991) (requiring procedural due process for prejudgment attachments).
14. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 761-65 (1976) (explaining the importance of protecting commercial speech); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (explaining the importance of protecting criticism of the government and government officials); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (eloquently explaining the rationale for protecting speech);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630-31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (articulating the
market-of-ideas rationale for freedom of speech).
15. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
16. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (using "Our Federalism" as the basis for
requiring federal courts to abstain when there is a pending state court criminal proceeding).
17. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (using state sovereignty and the Eleventh Amendment as the basis for limiting federal court jurisdiction to hear suits against state
governments).
18. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (preventing federal habeas corpus
petitions when there is a procedural default in state court).
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one can evaluate Professor Samuel H. Beer's 19 new book on federalism. Beer's central thesis is that history supports expansive national
powers and refutes the view that states retain substantial sovereignty.
In a brilliant exploration of history, starting with Thomas Aquinas
and continuing through the Framers' views, Beer seeks to demonstrate
that federalism need not be viewed solely as a conservative or regressive concept. Quite the contrary, Beer's express goal is to "rediscover"
federalism as a source for progress and for the protection of individual
rights. There is no doubt that Beer has made a major contribution to
the literature on the subject.
Whether Beer succeeds, however, depends on how his audience
views his goal. If one reads his book looking to gain a better understanding of the origins of American federalism, the book is a tremendous success. It is clearly written, impeccably documented, and
extremely persuasive. Moreover, if one wants to refute conservatives'
claims that the origins of the doctrine justify their view of federalism,
Beer's book is invaluable.
On the other hand, Beer's book is much less helpful if one is looking for insights as to how political and legal analysts have actually
used federalism since 1787. The introductory chapter sketches a brief
history of federalism since the Constitutional Convention, focusing on
issues raised by slavery, by the industrial revolution, and by the civil
rights movemenf (pp. 8-20). Beyond that, however, and the discussion
of the values ·of federalism iri the last chapter (pp. ·382-92), the book's
focus is entirely historical. Thus, Beer's book is of limited benefit for
approaching the issues specific to federalism that will confront government in the future. Rather, it is almost entirely about the intellectual
foundations of. federalism prior to the beginning of American
government.
·
Generally, it would be unfair to criticize a work of history for not
being "relevant" to later issues. However, Beer invites this reaction
with his preface and first chapter. There he begins by quoting Ronald
Reagan's view of federalism as American government being a compact
among the states (p. 2). In large part, the book is a thorough - indeed, brilliant - refutation of that view based on the historical origins
of federalism.
Yet, I question whether one can challenge a contemporary view
solely based on historical evidence. Two hundred years of American
experience are far more important in understanding the content of federalism than are the views of those who died long before the Constitution was drafted.
Therefore, I am left with a mixed reaction to Beer's book. As a
work of constitutional history, the book is flawless. Beer unquestiona19. Eaton Professor of the Science of Government, Emeritus, Harvard University.

Rehabilitating Federalism

May 1994]

1337

bly succeeds in refuting any historical claim that we should view
American democracy as a compact among the states. The book, however, cannot accomplish all that Beer seeks. As a basis for modem
analysis about federalism issues, the book's value is inherently very
limited. This, of co~se, is only a criticism to the extent that the book
seeks to provide a basis for contemporary analysis of federalism issues.
This review is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly describes
Beer's analysis. Part II explains why his historical exploration is of
limited benefit for understanding federalism issues as they have occurred over the course of American history. Finally, Part III considers aspects of Beer's book that offer insights warranting further
development in dealing with federalism issues.
By federalism, I simply mean the allocation of power between the
federal and state governments. More specifically, federalism, as used
throughout this review, refers to the extent to. which consideration of
state government autonomy has been and should be used as a limit on
federal power. 20 Of course, this is not the only meaning of federalism
or the only relevance of federalism considerations in American government. It is, however, the definition of federalism that is implicit in
Beer's book.
I.

PROFESSOR BEER'S HISTORY

'
.
Except for the first and last chapters, Beer's book is a history of the
ideas that formed the basis for American federalism. The book is organized into three ·parts.- The first part looks at the writings of
Thomas Aquinas, Jolin Milton, and Jam'es Harrington (pp. 31-131).
Beer contends that Aquinas's philosophy was the intellectual justification for monarchy. As such; it was this philosophy, above all, that
American government rejected: Beer, after describing Aquinas's political theory, states: "Th[e] double work of destroying the old doctrines
of virtue and grace and conceiving a new rationale for authority and
purpose laid the intellectual foundations for the American republic"
(pp. 64-65).
Beer suggests that John Milton's emphasis on government by discussion provided a key foundation for the American republic. Milton
saw individuals as autonomous and isolated in a manner much different than earlier philosophers had. Beer notes the importance of this
autonomy:
.

.

~

This new view of the individual leads to a new view of society, history, and government. Looked at in one way, Milton's individual is
painfully isolated. He no longer enjoys the moral and intellectual secur20. Federalism by this definition has both a descriptive element, referring to the extent to
which courts have used state sovereignty as a check on federal power, and a normative application, referring to the extent to which state sovereignty should be a limit on federal government
authority.
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ity that came from the deference of his inferiors and the guidance of his
superiors. Deprived of these vertical supports of the great chain of being, he confronts the enormous questions of belief and conduct, of good
and evil, alone with his reason and his God. On the other hand, since his
fellows have similar powers which they are exercising in the same quest,
he ~ and must look to them for counsel. [p. 74]

For this reason, rational deliberation is essential, and facilitating it is a
central function of government.
To conclude his first part, Beer describes the contribution of James
Harrington to American political thought. 13eer makes a compelling
case that Harrington played a pivotal role in the ultimate scheme of
American government. Harrington's tract, Oceana, 21 published in
1656, strongly advocated popular government as an alternative to
monarchy and authoritarian regimes. Beer notes that "[o]ne element
in this constitutional order was a vertical distribution of powers between center and periphery, protected by fundamental law. This
scheme of constitutional decentralization foreshadows the federal
structure adopted by the Americans in 1787" (p. 85).
Beer explains that Harrington sought to answer Machiavelli's view
that "diversity leads to disorder and that disorder leads to tyranny"
(p. 91). Harrington saw a solution in popular sovereignty and a federalist structure of government. Beer writes:
What the American student of federalism must find especially illuminating in Harrington's thought is how vividly it brings out the nationalist emphasis of the republican tradition. His advocacy is all the more
convincing because he considered other possibilities. He considered and
rejected the small state theory of republicanism advocated by
Machiavelli. He repeatedly spumed the confederate model later popularized by Montesquieu and adopted by many Anti-Federalists. [pp.
129-30]

The second part of the book describes republican thought as a
feature of the revolutionary sentiment (pp. 133-214). At the outset of
that part, Beer reminds the reader that the American rebels chose not
only independence but democratic government as well (p. 134). This
part of the book also explores the conflict over the appropriate nature
of American government at the earliest stages of American history.
Beer describes, for example, how the commitment to a republic articu. lated by men such as Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Paine also
justified a centralized government (pp. 153-62). Beer explains the importance of these thinkers to Framers such as Alexander Hamilton:
"In the spirit of Franklin, Alexander Hamilton construed the constitution of 1787 in the light of the tasks of nation-building and in his prophetic reports showed how an active central government could lead
21. JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656),
PoLmCAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 155 (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1977).

reprinted in
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the way toward making the country rich, powerful, and united" (p.
162).
The Framers, explains Beer, sought to assure both liberty and a
successful union by creating a national and federal republic (p. 195).
Beer sketches the competing philosophy ofthe anti-federalists that was
founded in the writings of Montesquieu and advocated a confederate
republic among sovereign states (pp. 219-93). Interestingly, Beer
points out that this philosophy had few advocates before 1787 or at the
Constitutional Convention but that the compact view of federalism
was resurrected in the late 1780s (pp. 236-37).
Beer then carefully reviews the writings of the Federalists, especially those of James Madison, and shows their rejection of compact
federalism (pp. 244-307). Furthermore, the ratification of the Constitution by the people supports Beer's contention that the Constitution
is not properly regarded as a compact among the states. 22
Beer's presentation of the history is superb. The writing is clear
and readable; the research impeccable. Beer has written the definitive
intellectual history of feqeralism in the United States. This review's
brief sketch cannot begin to describe the care and nuance in his historical account of the formation of American government.
II.

THE LIMITED USEFULNESS OF PROFESSOR BEER'S HISTORY

If Beer offered this history solely as an elucidation of the intellectual foundations of American federalism, I would have little to say in
this review. I would question the extent to which the views of Milton,
Harrington, or Montesquieu can be attributed to the Framers simply
because the Framers were familiar with their writings and relied upon
some of their ideas. But this would not in any way undermme the
value of a clear description of the intellectual foundations of
federalism.
Moreover, Beer seeks at the very least to refute the historical underpinnings of the view that American government is best understood
as a compact among the states. At this level, too, I have nothing but
praise for Beer's effort. ·
Apparently, however, Beer seeks to go further than this. In the
introduction and last chapter, Beer professes to link his historical analysis to modem debates about federalism. In the introduction he
writes: "Whether one is trying to say what is the law of American
federalism or what is the proper use to be made of that law, one can
hardly arrive at an unambiguous conclusion without explicitly or implicitly supplementing the argument by drawing on. a framework of
22. This, of course, was the approach taken by Chief Justice John Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). According to Marshall, the people, and not the states,
created the national government by approving the Constitution, and thus the people, and not the
states, retain ultimate sovereignty. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402-05.
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theory" (p. 23). Beer sees history as providing that theory, explicitly
believing that his "reconstruction of nationalist thought presents ... a
past which is usable today" (p. 25).
It is at this level - in the linkage of his historical analysis to modem issues concerning federalism - that I question Beer's conclusions.
First, an understanding of American federalism is impossible without
a view to the experiences of the two hundred years since the framing of
the Constitution. As a matter of intellectual history, the constant
presence of the compact view lends it credibility, regardless of the
views of the Framers Beer quotes. In other words, Beer implicitly assumes that compact theory depends on historical authenticity for its
legitimacy. However, one can justify the theory as a viable conception
of American government by defending its normative desirability entirely apart from its historical pedigree.
Moreover, American experiences since 1787, much more than
those earlier, are a powerful refutation of compact theory. Most notably, the Civil War and the constitutional amendments that followed it
dramatically changed the conception of the relationship of the federal
and state govemments. 23 More recently, the assertion of compact theory by southern states seeking to avoid desegregation was dramatically
unsuccessful. The repeated rejection of compact federalism since 1787
is a powerful argument against it, if it is to be evaluated from a historical perspective.
Beer clearly recognizes the importance of these intervening events.
In the introduction, he suggests that the national idea confronted three
great trials: "the trial of sectionalism, culminating in the Civil War;
the trial of industrialism, culminating in the great depression and the
New Deal; and the trial of racism, which continues to rack our country today." 24 Although it might have required another book, I wish
that Beer had done more to describe the relationship of these events to
his theory. They, much more than the intellectual history that preceded the Constitution, shaped the modem theory and practice of
federalism.
Moreover, I question whether the debate between the national and
compact views of federalism is at the core of contemporary disputes
over federalism. The central federalism issue in modem constitutional
law is whether, and to what extent, state sovereignty limits federal
powers. 25 Is there a zone of activities assigned to the states for their
exclusive control? Do some federal actions unduly interfere with state
sovereignty?
The answers to these questions are rarely put in terms of compact
federalism. Indeed, even those completely persuaded by Beer's refuta23. BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 81-104 (1991),
24. P. 8; see also ACKERMAN, supra note 23, at 58-59.
25. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408, 2417-19 (1992).
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tion of the historical pedigree of compact federalism still could defend
state sovereignty as an important value. They could justify the need to
protect state governments from congressional overreaching based on
the values served by federalism and the benefits gained by vigilant protection of state sovereignty. 2 6
.
Moreover, a central question is whether the paradox of modem
federalism since 1937 - federalism as a limit on the federaljudicial
power but not on the federal legislative power - is justified. This crucial question cannot be answered in historical terms: The professed
justifications for deferring to state courts, especially the reliance on
comity and parity as reasons for limits on federal judicial power, do
not depend on acceptance of the compact theory of federalism. 27
Simply put, the scholarly literature of the 1980s persuasively demonstrates the limited usefulness of originalist approaches to constitutional interpretation.28 These criticisms apply equally to any attempt
to use Beer's analysis as a basis for contemporary constitutional decisionmaking. Did the Framers really have one view, or were there
many views not captured in the Federalists' perspective? Why should
the Framers' conception of federalism be controlling, even if it is
knowable? Serious questions remain about using Beer's historical
analysis - or any purely historical analysis - to draw conclusions in
the modem constitutional debates.

III.

PROFESSOR BEER'S CONTRIBUTION TO MODERN ANALYSIS

I believe that the central problem with the Supreme Court's approach to federalism is that it has treated the concept as if it were a
rule for deciding cases rather than an important value to be weighed
and considered in decisionmaking. When the Court has relied upon
federalism, it has reasoned in a quite mechanical, formalistic manner.
The Court has defined rigid categories of activities left to the states production in the earlier era, freedom from federal control of legislation or regulation in the modem one - and invalidated laws that intrude into these areas. By using this categorical approach, the Court
has avoided careful consideration of the values of federalism.
I believe that federalism decisions should take a different approach.
In any case concerning federalism, the Court should explicitly identify
26. See Robert F. Nagel, Federalism as a Fundamental Value: National League of Cities in
Perspective, 1981 SUP. Cr. REv. 81, 97-109. See generally Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP. Cr. REV. 341.
27. For a discussion of comity and parity as a basis for federal courts' decisions, see ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.5, at 29-33 (1989).
28. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L.
REV. 204 (1980) (arguing against originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation); Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 471-500 (1981) (same); Larry
Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 603 (1985) (same).
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the values of federalism to be served - or compromised - by a particular judicial ruling. The Court also should identify the competing
concerns and explicitly describe the basis for its ultimate balance.
Certainly, the values of federalism can include traditionally invoked justifications such as limiting federal tyranny, encouraging responsive government, and protecting states as laboratories.29 I believe,
however, that in very few cases will any of these values really be at
issue when the Court considers the constitutionality of a federal statute or the appropriateness of a particular limit on federal court jurisdiction. It is very difficult to think of past Supreme Court cases in
which these values really were at stake.
Instead, I suggest that it would be desirable to expand the types of
values of federalism that the courts consider in their weighing process.
Here, Beer's analysis is potentially very useful. Beer articulates three
values served by federalism (p. 386-88). One value he labels community (p. 386). He writes: "The argument from community, which descended from the political philosophy of ancient Greece through
medieval conceptions of the organic, corporate society, had been reformulated by continental thinkers such as Althusis and Bodin. This
idealization of the small community had played no part in the thought
of the American rebels ... " (p. 386).
Communities have many values worth protecting. Safeguarding
community decisionmaking enhances diversity as groups are allowed
to decide their own nature and composition. Communities can define
themselves to serve most effectively the needs of their members. Thus,
the Court can ask in a particular case whether a specific federal law
likely intrudes upon the ability of a community to define itself and, if
so, whether another important interest justifies the federal action.
The attention to community as a federalism concern need not be
limited to cases concerning the Tenth Amendment and federal jurisdiction. For example, in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 30 the Court
upheld a zoning ordinance that limited the number of unrelated individuals who could live together in the same household, 31 emphasizing
community self-determination. In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 32
however, the Court declared unconstitutional a similar restriction
when it was applied to keep a grandmother from living with her two
grandsons, who were first cousins. 33 The community's interest was
the same, but the Court explained that the application of the East
Cleveland zoning ordinance violated the constitutional right to keep
29. For a summary of these traditional arguments, see GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONST!·
134-38 (2d ed. 1991).
30. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
31. 416 U.S. at 2.
32. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
33. 431 U.S. at 499.
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the family together.34
The value of community will need elaboration and judicial development. It is not a value that will lead to predictable decisions. Instead,· it is an important consideration that the Court should expressly
weigh in its federalism decisions.
Beer identifies a second value of federalism: utility. He writes:
The argument from utility had provided a rationale for the divisjon
of authority between the colonies and Westminster when the prerevolutionary debate turned to the federal option. Reflecting the way economists think . . . it was and has continued to be a sensible and practical
premise for deciding what functions should be assigned respectively to
central and to local governments. [pp. 386-87]

There are some tasks that are better accomplished on a national
scale, some that are better done at a state level, and some that are best
handled at the local level. Undoubtedly, this should be a relevant consideration in congressional decisionmaking about what federal laws'to
enact. However, it is unclear how much weight the judiciary should
give to utility when it evaluates the constitutionality of federal laws on
federalism grounds. Absent a reason to distrust congressional determinations, there is no reason why Congress cannot consider utility arguments and give efficiency concerns their appropriate weight.
Also, efficiency is a value the Supreme Court should consider as it
defines the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The Court must
treat efficiency and utility, though, as among the values to be attained
and not as the ultimate goals of the system. Any restriction of federal
c9urt jurisdiction arguably enhances efficiency by decreasing federal
court caseloads. The focus must be on the detriments of jurisdictional
restrictions as compared with the benefits in efficiency to be gained.
Finally, Beer suggests that liberty is avalue to be gained by federalism. He writes: "The argument which was foremost in the minds of
the framers and which still holds greatest promise as a rationale for
states is the argument from liberty" (p. 387). Federalism is most likely
to enhance liberty when state governments expand the scope of individual rights beyond those protected by the federal government. 35 For
example, courts in many states have found a state constitutional right
to substantial equality in educational funding. 36 Likewise, states have
used their constitutions to provide more protection for speech and ad34. 431 U.S. at 505.
35. See Robert N.C. Nix, Jr., Federalism in the Twenty-First Century - Individual Liberties
in Search of a Guardian, in FEDERALISM: THE SHIFTING BALANCE 65 (Janice c. Griffith ed.,
1989) (arguing that state courts should and do exercise leadership in defining and protecting
individual liberties as the federal courts retreat from doing so).
36. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976) (finding a right to substantial equality of educational expenditures under the California state constitution), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907
(1977).
.
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ditional safeguards for privacy. 37
I believe that the values of community, utility, and liberty although each needs to be much more fully developed - provide a
better basis for judicial decisionmaking than the traditional values invoked for federalism. The task for a court will be to analyze the extent
to which a particular law undermines these values and then to balance
that need against the benefits of the federal authority. In other words,
and most important, the court's role should be to consider these values
and countervalues expressly as they apply in particular cases.
Consider an example: How should the Court have handled New
York v. United States 38 under this approach? The Court would need
to ask whether requiring state cleanup of low-level nuclear wastes in
some way intruded upon the ability of communities to define themselves. It is highly doubtful that assuring the safe cleanup of hazardous wastes would adversely affect community self-determination. Nor
does it seem that the federal regulation would compromise the values
of utility or liberty. Relying on states to ensure cleanup is probably
more efficient than creating or relying upon federal enforcement. No
one's liberty seems unduly restricted by mandating that states assure
the safe disposal of nuclear wastes.
Thus, from the perspective of the underlying values that should
drive the new, reoriented federalism, the Court's decision in New York
v. United States seems misguided. It is highly questionable how the
federal law really compromised any of the important values behind
protecting federalism.
Discussions about community, utility, and liberty are inherently
indeterminate, and advocates and scholars might try to use these values to argue for a particular result. But the key is that courts should
discuss these values and expressly weigh them in the judicial decisionmaking process.
Is anything really gained by focusing on these particular values as
opposed to the abstract statements that have long dominated discussions about federalism? For several reasons, I think so. Most of all,
the goal should be to encourage courts to consider and discuss carefully the values of federalism in rendering particular decisions. The
values of community, utility, and liberty focus attention directly on
the underlying concerns. Ideally, judicial opinions that expressly balance these considerations will be better reasoned and will provide
more guidance to lower courts and commentators.
Perhaps best of all, attention to the underlying values of federalism
provides a way to end the paradox that has plagued federalism juris37. See, e.g., PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (upholding a state
constitutional right of access to shopping centers for speech, though no such right exists in the
U.S. Constitution).
38. 112 s. Ct. 2408 (1992).
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prudence for fifty-five years. The rule should not be that federal laws
are always upheld when there is a federalism challenge. Nor should it
be a bright-line principle that all federal laws that compel state legislative or regulatory activity are unconstitutional. Rather, the Court
should consider each federalism challenge to a federal statute individually and in each instance decide the case with careful and explicit attention to the values of federalism. At the same time, the Court
should give more attention to the values of federalism in the area of
limits on the federal judicial power. Over time, courts probably will
use federalism as a limit on both the federal judiciary and the federal
legislative power in relatively rare instances. The treatment of these
two powers, however, will be the same, and hopefully, the paradoxical
handling of federalism issues will end.
CONCLUSION

The dispute over allocating power between the national and state
governments is inherent in the constitutional design. Beer approaches
this as a historical question. He seeks to show what view of federalism
is preferable by reviewing the intellectual history that underlies the
American Constitution.
Beer's implicit assumption is that champions of states' rights believe that history justifies their position. Those who disagree with
Beer's conclusion might accept this premise and offer a different historical analysis that emphasizes the views of the anti-federalists. Alternatively, and I think more profitably, they might argue that,
regardless of history, state sovereignty is an important value that justifies limiting the power of the national government. Although I agree
with Beer's conclusions, I believe one can only justify them with normative arguments about the desirability of federalism as a constitutional principle.
Moreover, even if the debate over federalism occurs at both the
historical and the normative level, something is missing in understanding the role of federalism in American government. Federalism has
long been a rhetorical strategy used by those who oppose particular
federal efforts to argue against the proposed federal actions without
addressing their merits. The opponents of abolition, or of social security, or of civil rights advances, challenged the reforms based not on
their intrinsic desirability but rather on the process grounds of federalism. The persistence of the view that Beer seeks to refute has much
less to do with its historical legitimacy and much more to do with its
political usefulness.
Perhaps, just perhaps, works like Beer's book that challenge the
historical basis for protecting state sovereignty might also, over time,
undermine the political persuasiveness of such appeals. Any relationship between scholarly historical writings and political rhetoric is in-

1346

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 92:1333

herently tenuous. But all who discuss federalism in the future - and
especially those who ground their arguments in history - would be
well advised to read carefully Professor Beer's masterful new book.

